The Catrosa Network: EU companies linked to Russian chemical weapons developers
A network of companies run by a Russian-Spanish family was selling chemicals to weapons developers and agencies connected to Russian intelligence among its customers.
An investigation in partnership with OCCRP, Important Stories, Belarusian Investigative Center and Slidstvo_info
Last October Spanish police seized banned chemicals destined for Russia and arrested nine people suspected of breaching EU sanctions. Investigators and reporters discovered the Catrosa network, companies established in Spain and Russia, using techniques to obfuscate chemical exports to Russia and found out the Russian importer’s clients included notorious weapons developers and agencies connected to Russian intelligence and allegedly involved in the novichok programme. Dual-use chemicals exported include diethylamine, a chemical involved in the manufacturing of the nerve agent VX.
From Spanish tapas to investigation for dual-use chemical procurement to Russia
Located in the vibrant area of Poblenou in Barcelona, the wine and tapas restaurant Cavina Vinoteca has received raving reviews since its opening a few months ago: “Very nice wine cellar, everything is new and tastefully decorated, variety of wines for all tastes, selected dishes very well prepared, prices a little above average.” On its affiliated website, Cavina, clients can order wines coming from different Spanish vineyards. This trendy restaurant and wine bar is one of the most recent ventures devoted to Spanish gastronomy for an entrepreneurial family which owns businesses in Spain and Russia.
Photo of Cavina Vinoteca in Barcelona (source: Instagram)
Irina Muraviev Oleinikova, a young bubbly woman, learnt the ropes at Glovo, a Spanish version of the most famous food delivery brands while her brother, Vyacheslav Muraviev Oleinikova, has studied architecture. They have succeeded in exporting their business to Russia with their mother, Maria Oleinikova, an ex-chemist, and a Russian business partner, Pavel Grinin. Together they have created the Cavina brand in Moscow and have opened several wine bars and two restaurants in Barcelona and Moscow. The family also runs a Spanish business called Complexe Sancu which is exporting both wines and chemicals to Russia.
But since October 2024, Maria, Irina and Vyacheslav along with other related people are being investigated by the police for procuring dual-use chemicals to Russia, including to Russian military labs known for their involvement in the manufacturing of novichok nerve agent, through a complex network of companies across the European Union and beyond.
A gigantic seizure of NMP in Barcelona
On October 16th, 2024, the Spanish authorities launched “Operation Probirka” (test tube in Russian) part of a Spanish investigation into the illegal supply of chemicals, Spain’s Interior Ministry said in a statement at the time, but since then the government has provided almost no details about the case. The Spanish authorities seized 13 tonnes of N-Methyl-2-pyrrolidone (NMP), a solvent widely used in the industry, destined to Russia through Complex Sancu, one of the family’s companies. The investigators filmed rows and rows of barrels stamped with a sticker from BYN Chemicals, a Chinese chemical supplier specialised in manufacturing NMP in the port of Barcelona. The seizure is unique enough for Spanish authorities to publish a short video and a press release while the on-going investigation remains secret. Four people, the Oleinikova-Muraviev family and a representative of a chemical company were arrested.
Images from Spanish Police October 2024
On February 13th 2025, the Spanish police proceeded to the second phase of Operation Probirka and seized computers, documents inside unnamed offices. Five more people working at Spanish chemical suppliers were arrested by Spanish authorities.
Images from Spanish Police in February 2025
A Spanish police source involved in the investigation said authorities suspect Oleinikova was an “intermediary” who arranged the shipments. (The officer was authorized to speak to the press, but not to be identified by name.).
While NMP could be random, its destination to Russia has made it suspicious. The substance was listed as part of the restricted items under the European Union regulation No 833/2014 on April 13th 2022 governing the export control of dual-use items and advanced technology items to Russia. The chemical also appears on the list of restricted items to Syria, known for Bashar al-Assad’s regime’s use of chemical weapons on its population.
But how a solvent widely employed in the production of pharmaceuticals, electronics, lithium-ion batteries, and polymers could be a problem? NMP can be dual-use, meaning it can be very suitable for certain military related uses, as several experts confirmed to us during the course of this investigation: manufacturing lithium-ion batteries critical to power advanced weapons systems and other military equipment, used as a solvent in propellant formulations for missile and rocket fuel processing, used as a solvent or reagent in the production of restricted substances.
According to Dan Kaszeta, an international expert on chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, NMP is indeed useful in a number of industrial processes but in itself is not directly part of a production pathway to a chemical warfare agent. However “NMP is very useful in nanoparticle manufacture. It is possible and, widely speculated, that the Navalny assassination involved novichok agents encapsulated in nanoparticles”.
The shipment seized by the Spanish authorities is one out of several shipments of the restricted chemical NMP since the start of the war destined to Russia. Drawing on Russian import data, reporters found that Oleinikova doesn’t just operate in Spain — she also majority-owns a Russian chemical company called Catrosa Reactiv that received at least 36 shipments of sanctioned chemicals from Spain between 2022 and 2024— including one that came directly from Complexe Sancu, the Spanish wine-and-beer export company run by Oleinkova and her children
Most of the other shipments were made by a Spanish company called Scharlab S.L., which is headquartered in Barcelona with subsidiaries in Italy and the Philippines, import data shows. Scharlab is majority-owned by Werner Scharlau, a German living in Spain who was among those arrested in February.
The Catrosa network
Oleinikova, a trained chemist, created a company with her husband in Spain called Catrosa Productos Quimicos in Barcelona in October 2005. Dimtri Muraviev was then a professor of chemistry at the Autonomous University of Barelona. The pair set up later on two companies in Russia: Catrosa Reactiv LLC and Lavarsan LLC in, respectively, November 2006 and September 2012 with a partner, Pavel Grinin, another chemist. The Russian company register shows that Oleinikova became Catrosa Reactiv’s majority shareholder in 2015 and still holds a controlling stake in the firm.
In parallel of their historical business, Maria and Pavel have embarked their two families in a wine business since 2015 to import Spanish wines and Spanish cuisine to Russia through wine shops and tapas restaurants in both Barcelona and Moscow under a brand they created: Cavina.
In order to export wines, tapas and chemicals, both Cavina and Catrosa have used a common company created in 2009: Complex Sancu SL, located in Spain and owned by Maria Oleinikova and her children. The company’s website is not finished and indicates Complexe Sancu is an export company.
Screenshot of the Complex Sancu’s website
According to various import/export data the company has been used to export both wines and chemicals to Russia. While throughout the years chemical suppliers have been both European and Asian, Catrosa has had a distribution agreement with ITW Reagents, a company located in Monza in Italy and formed by the German AppliChem GmbH, the Italian Nova Chimica Srl and the Spanish Panreac Química SLU. It is not clear if it was still the case at the start of the war in Ukraine.
ITW Reagents’s Facebook account promoting their boot at Pharmtech exhibition in Russia and Catrosa Reactiv their distributor in 2018
Catrosa hired a Russian national procurement officer, Dennis Volkoff, based in Thailand in the past two years, likely to diversify the company’s chemical suppliers in Asia. On his Linkedin profile, Volkoff lists his successes for Catrosa: contracts with Chinese firms like Concord Technology Tianjin Co, Liaoning Oxiranphex Inc., and Indian suppliers like Bimal Pharma PVT Ltd, Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Corporation Limited, Dhanraj Sugars Pvt Ltd, Pallav Chemicals & Solvents Pvt Ltd, some of which appear in the collected data.
Screenshot of Dennis Volkoff’s Linkedin account in charge of brokering deals with chemical suppliers in Asia.
Dual-use chemicals across Europe through a complex logistics network
Since the start of the Ukrainian war, Catrosa has maintained business activity despite supply chain challenges stemming from international sanctions on Russia. The company has responded by developing a complex logistical network and diversifying its supply chain to continue serving clients.
In addition to the NMP, the media consortium identified other chemicals listed on EU sanction list for Russia. While none were specifically associated with chemical weapons in Catrosa Reactiv’s import data. However, they had multiple potential uses, including creating explosives according to Miguel Ángel Sierra, a professor of organic chemistry at the Complutense University of Madrid and former member of the scientific advisory board of the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
“These have been banned by the European Union because they are industrial products,” he explained. “For example, there are many processes you can’t carry out, including the preparation of explosives, the preparation of pharmaceuticals, and the preparation of many other things, without having some of these products.”
Some shipments of chemicals — including nitric acid and acetone, both used in the manufacture of explosives, and diethylamine, a chemical involved in the manufacturing of the nerve agent VX — had already left Spain for Russia, police said.
According to commercial import/export data, Catrosa has been relying on a network of European logistics companies. These EU-based logistics networks were used by both Complexe Sancu SL and Scharlab SL to ship chemicals to Catrosa Reactive LLC in Russia mainly via Poland and Belarus.
But the supply chain system can become more opaque and complex. The logistics company STS Logistics LLC appears on some import trade data for shipments from Complexe Sancu SL to Catrosa Reactiv LLC in Russia in April 2024.This company, with an office in Moscow, has been identified by NAKO, a Ukrainian civil society organisation working to tackle corruption in Ukraine’s defence sector and counter global strategic corruption that fuels Russia’s war machine, as one of the enablers of Russia to acquire microelectronics for Russia’s war effort.
Exporters mixed batches of sanctioned chemicals inside larger shipments of legal substances, or listed false destinations on customs paperwork, such as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, to disguise the fact that shipments were headed for Russia, investigators told OCCRP. One of the investigators working on the case told OCCRP that evidence obtained so far shows the shipments did not in fact pass through those countries, and that the companies listed as recipients were fronts.
According to import records, Catrosa Reactiv received one shipment of the sanctioned chemical NMP in 2023 that originated in Spain, but was routed via a Kyrgyz company, NK Muras LLC. In 2024, Complexe Sancu, the Spanish export company managed by Maria Oleinikova’s children, sent at least one shipment of NMP to NK Muras. Available records do not show whether that shipment ultimately ended up with Catrosa Reactiv. Separate transaction data obtained by reporters indicate that Catrosa Reactiv paid NK Muras more than $240,000 in 2023 for three shipments of unspecified pharmaceutical ingredients.
The use of companies in third countries like Kygyzstan to get around export bans is a common tactic, according to OLAF experts, the EU’s anti-fraud office also involved in investigating the case. “We’ve seen cases of smuggling of goods directly into Russia, but in most cases we find shipments from the EU going to third countries, as if they were legal,” an OLAF representative said. “They send the substance or product to countries like Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Kazakhstan.…And from there, our work begins trying to trace the goods and determine whether the final destination is actually these countries or whether the final destination is Russia.”
NK Muras website
The logistics was arranged on the “order” of NK Muras by Vlate Logistics, a Belarussian company close to President Lukashenko. The logistics company used to be affiliated with the Bremino group, which was owned by Alexey Oleksin, Nikolay Vorobey, Alexander Zaytsev – The three of them belong to Alexander Lukashenko close circle. They were sanctioned in 2021, however, one year before that, they changed the ownership structure of Vlate Logistics, and a group of individuals (Oleg Gerasim, Oleg Petrov, Evegeniy Krahotin, Oleg Barabanov, Dmitry Zamulevich and Vladimir Arkadyev) became the company’s owners. According to the article, all of these individuals have close ties to the owners of Bremino Group and they were only added as owners to avoid sanctions. Oleg Fedorovich Barabanov is a Belarusian citizen and he is also sanctioned by OFAC. Vlate logistics LLC was sanctioned by OFAC in 2024.
Neither NK Muras nor Vlate Logistik responded to requests for comment.
Feeding chemicals to Russian military labs and MoD suppliers
Thanks to financial and commercial documents obtained and analysed by the investigative consortium, reporters have identified Catrosa’s clients. The company’s main customers are pharmaceutical companies and labs like Akvametria, Generyum or Mikrogen, affiliated with the Russian state and Rostec, and declared as a company of strategic importance for Russia’s national security. Other clients, however, are directly connected to the Ministry of Defense and intelligence services.
Reporters have identified military labs involved in very sensitive research. Catrosa Reactiv received 22 payments between January 2021 and May 2023 worth $49,000 from sanctioned Novichok manufacturer GosNIIOKhT.
Another client of Catrosa is the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Accoustics (FGUP NIIPA), a government scientific research institute that carries out research and development of military products and develops methods for the export of dual-use goods and technologies. According to the US State Department, the institute has been involved in the procurement of chemicals that could be used in the production of chemical weapons agents. Between February 2021 and November 2024, Catrosa Reactiv received 41 payments worth $51,000 from the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Acoustics.
Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Catrosa Reactiv was paid by the 48th Central Scientific Research Institute in 2015, a major state-run biological weapons facility sanctioned by the U.S. in 2021. One of the Institute’s suppliers, Scientific Center Signal, a military research institute linked to the chemical weapon programme, was also a customer of Catrosa Reactiv in 2017.
In 2024, Catrosa Reactiv received approximately $6,300 across nine payments for unspecified goods from the 18th Central Research Institute, known as Military Unit 11135, which is part of Russia’s GRU military intelligence service. The unit is one of the military laboratories in charge of signal intelligence (SIGINT) handling the research on material stolen by the Russian military intelligence according to the Insider.
In 2023 and 2024, Catrosa Reactiv also received two payments worth around $750 for the amino acid alanin and solvent hexane from the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, an agency that developed weapons in the Soviet era including the first Soviet atomic bomb. The institute has since shifted toward building and managing Russia’s most advanced supercomputers.
Finally, suppliers of the Ministry of Defense in Russia have been purchasing chemicals to Catrosa Reactiv. Systems of Biological Synthesis LLC (SBS) , which supplies the 48th military research centre according to public procurement database, has registered three transactions from 2021 to 2023 with Catrosa Reactiv worth around $800. The Special Design and Technology Bureau (SKTB), a sanctioned explosive manufacturer has purchased unidentified chemicals from Catrosa Reactiv since 2021, including $27,000 worth of propionic anhydride — a chemical commonly used in the manufacture of perfumes, oils, dyes, and pharmaceuticals.
Spain’s Audiencia Nacional — a court that deals with terrorism and major crimes — confirmed to our partner, OCCRP, that Oleinikova and her two children are among nine suspects currently under investigation for “smuggling banned substances.” All nine suspects have been released while the investigation continues, and no one has been charged with a crime, the press department for the court said. Oleinikova declined to comment for this story because the case is still under investigation by the Audiencia Nacional.